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Abstract: 
This dissertation examines politically-connected equity analysts, i.e., analysts that make large 
political donations. I find that these big donor analysts make more accurate earnings forecasts 
than other small donor and non-donor analysts, and the accuracy of these forecasts decreases 
after a big donor analyst ceases his donations. These analysts become more accurate after they 
become large political donors, suggesting their enhanced performance derives from an advantage 
gained via their political activity. These results are stronger when (i) the analyst works or lives in 
the state represented by the benefiting politician, and (ii) the benefiting politician serves on a 
Congressional committee that regulates the covered firm. Overall, these results suggest that big 
donor analysts benefit from relationships with politicians who possess knowledge that impacts 
firms’ prospects. 
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Section 1. Introduction 
 
By some estimates, hedge funds and other institutional investors spend more than $400 
million per year on gathering political intelligence, and the information generated is now a major 
source of returns for these investors.1 In April 2012, the US government passed into law the Stop 
Insider Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act. This legislation restricts 
congressional insiders from using material non-public information to trade stocks for personal 
profit, a practice that attracts considerable attention during the financial crisis. 2  This is an 
important policy goal given past research showing that the investments’ of Congressional 
Insiders outperform the broader markets, suggesting that these insiders have valuable and 
potentially market moving information (Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd, and Ziobrowski, 2004). 
I examine whether sell-side analysts at brokerage firms issue more accurate earnings 
forecasts when they have ties to political insiders. I use political donations by analysts as a proxy 
for determining which analysts have a relationship with political insiders. Based on personal 
donations by the analyst to politicians or their proxy political action committees (PACs), I am 
able to identify those analysts who may have a relationship with a politician that yields valuable 
information and access to political decisions makers. 
 While the STOCK Act made insider trading by members of congress illegal for the first 
time, it is primarily focused on preventing trading by members of congress. It does not explicitly 
bar politicians from passing information to analysts, but instead requires a study by the 
                                                          
1
 See “Buying Political Intelligence Can Pay Off Big for Wall Street”, The Wall Street Journal, January 18, 2013. 
Some of these funds are for donations to candidates, such as the $4+ million Barack Obama and Mitt Romney 
received in 2012 according to FEC data, but the funds are also used to hire a group of socially and politically 
connected individuals. 
2
  See for example, Business Insider, Nov 14, 2011, ‘The Congress Insider Trading Scandal is Outrageous’ by Henry 
Blodget, and Bloomberg, June 13, 2009 ‘Durbin Invests With Buffet After Funds Sale Amid Market Plunge’ by 
James Rowley. 
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Comptroller General of the United States on the political intelligence industry by April 2013 
under Section 7 of the act. This study by the Comptroller examined “the legal and ethical issues 
that may be raised by the sale of political intelligence”, but after concluding that political 
intelligence was widespread and that its value was difficult to discern, the report concluded that 
legislation on the issue would be fraught with difficulties.3 There is a significant ongoing debate 
in the legal field over the political intelligence industry and its legal legitimacy (Nagy and 
Painter, 2012; Kim, 2012; Bainbridge, 2012). 
One interpretation of this legislative language is that current statutes do not prohibit 
politicians or their staffers from passing information to outside third parties. This suggests 
information could be legally used by outside parties in at least two different ways; (1) the 
information could be used for stock trading as part of a “mosaic” of public and private 
information (which is allowed under current insider trading laws)4, or (2) the information could 
be disseminated publicly by the recipient. In this dissertation, I investigate this latter scenario; 
specifically, do stock analysts obtain relevant information from political insiders and then use 
this information to improve earnings forecasts on firms they cover? 
Overall, I show that “big donor” analysts (in the top 5% of all contributions in any given 
year) are 9% more accurate than other analysts and they are 13% more likely to cover a 
government supplier or heavily regulated firm than other analysts are. These results hold after 
accounting for analyst fixed effects, covered firm fixed effects, analyst characteristics, covered 
firm characteristics, and a variety of other control variables. In fact, an analyst becomes more 
accurate in the year he first becomes a big donor.  
                                                          
3
 See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ105/html/PLAW-112publ105.htm for the complete text of the 
STOCK Act and http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-389 for the text of the Comptroller General’s report. 
4
 The CFA Institute recognizes Mosaic Theory as a legal means of stock analysis using a combination of immaterial 
inside information and publicly available information. Various business dictionary provide a definition for the term 
including the following: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/mosaic-theory.html 
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Relationships between analysts and politicians appear to be correlated with large 
donations by the analyst, but such donations may not be the causal factor in the development of 
the relationship. Although I find a time pattern consistent with the causal hypothesis, I conduct 
additional tests to confirm the relationship.  I find that an analyst’s accuracy is positively related 
to the closeness in time between the analyst’s political donation, and the release of his quarterly 
earnings estimates. Additionally, there is mixed evidence suggesting that analysts are more 
accurate when they work or live in the state represented by the politician that benefits most from 
the analyst’s donation, as well as when the politician serves on a committee that regulates the 
firm being covered by the analyst. Finally, earnings estimates are more accurate when the analyst 
in question has a recent track-record of forecasting outperformance. 
To my knowledge, this work is the first to show empirical evidence of the role analysts 
play in gathering political intelligence. I show that this information is valuable when making 
firm specific earnings forecasts. The role of analysts in gathering this information is particularly 
noteworthy in a post Reg-FD world, when most relevant firm specific information is widely 
disseminated via the internet, and analyst research departments are struggling to justify their 
existence as a cost center at many brokerages (Green, Jame, Markov, and Subasi 2012). This 
work suggests that analysts are especially valuable when they have access to private information 
and can connect investors and insiders, either directly or indirectly. Political intelligence is one 
example of how analysts can continue to gather unique information for investors, but there are 
likely other opportunities they can exploit as well. 
There are three current lines of research that are closely aligned with this dissertation. 
The first deals with the impact of corporate political donations, and demonstrates how firms can 
benefit themselves and their shareholders through donations (for example, Cooper, Gulen, and 
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Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Correia, 2012; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012). These benefits can be through a 
form of regulatory capture, or through special interest benefits conveyed by Congress. This 
dissertation demonstrates how information about the special benefits granted to some firms (or 
penalties to competitors of favored firm) can be conveyed to markets through analysts. 
The second related line of the literature deals with how individuals use political donations 
to maximize their own well being. Broadly, individuals act within their own best interest when 
making political donations rather than acting based on political ideology that might be 
detrimental to their own economic well-being (for example, Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni, 2012; 
Belo, Gala, and Li, 2013). This behavior enables the analyst to gain information which benefits 
themselves and their clients without regard for personal political convictions. 
The third related line of literature deals with how investors behave based on the political 
climate and the actions of firms. Here, a paper by Jiang, Kumar, and Law (2012) examines 
equity analysts and political behavior, but through the lens of political affiliation. They show that 
Republican equity analysts are more cautious in incorporating new information into their 
earnings forecasts, and in making new recommendations. Overall, their conclusion is that 
Republican equity analysts are more conservative in their professional roles as analysts 
compared with their peers. In contrast, I examine whether large political donations are associated 
with greater accuracy regardless of political affiliation with a particular focus on which channel 
any associated effects operate through. Thus, while our work is related, their focus is on the 
effect of a specific personal characteristic (political leanings); my focus is on a novel way in 
which analysts provide value, and the source and magnitude of that value.  
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Section 2 covers background 
literature in greater detail and then Section 3 sets out my hypotheses based on this literature. 
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Section 4 deals with data and methodology, Section 5 examines the results, Section 6 discusses 
robustness checks and additional tests performed, while Section 7 concludes. 
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Section 2. Past Research 
 
There is substantial support in the literature for the notion that political views impact 
investment decisions. For example, Bonaparte, Kumar, and Page (2012) show that investors’ 
attitudes towards the markets are influenced by the political atmosphere in Washington. Hong 
and Kostovetsky (2011) show that mutual fund managers who make campaign donations to 
Democrats hold less of their portfolios in companies that are deemed socially irresponsible, 
while Chin and Parwada (2010) show that Republican (Democratic) institutional investors during 
the 2000 election were over weighted in stocks that were most likely to benefit from a Bush 
(Gore) presidency. Hutton, Jiang and Kumar (2013) find that firms with Republican managers 
take on less risk in their professional capacities as managers. Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, and 
Graffin (2012) find similar effects related to managerial political views and corporate taxes, and 
Hutton, Jiang and Kumar (2012) find that corporate misconduct is related to managerial political 
views. 
There is also a large body of evidence that political donors, both corporations and 
individuals, receive direct benefits from recipient politicians. Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 
(2010) show that political donations by firms are associated with larger future returns. Their 
results are important to this work in that they show that even relatively small sums of money 
from individual firm donations can influence the behavior of politicians. Similarly, Mian, Sufi, 
and Trebbi (2012) show that subprime lenders and borrowers influenced congressional voting 
decisions in the time period leading up to the financial crisis. Kim, Pantzalis, and Park (2012) 
show firms in geographic areas that exert considerable political influence have higher stock 
returns than firms in areas with lower levels of political influences. Correia (2012) finds 
politically connected firms are less likely to be involved in an SEC enforcement action and face 
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lower penalties on average. Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar (2012) find that politically 
connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected peers. In sum, 
these papers provide the basis for my hypothesis that analysts associated with large donations to 
politicians may receive beneficial information directly from the politicians.  
The view that political donations are beneficial to the donor is contentious however, and 
other authors have come to different conclusions about the usefulness of corporate donations on 
firm value. Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2012) find that political donor corporations have 
lower free cash flows and lower returns. In a similar vein, Boubakri, El Ghoul, and Saffar (2012) 
show that politically connected firms exhibit acute agency problems, and hold more cash than 
non-connected peers. Faccio (2010) examines evidence from firms in 47 countries and shows 
that companies with political connections have higher leverage, and underperform compared to 
non-connected companies. Duchin and Sosyura (2012) show that politically connected firms 
were more likely to receive TARP funds during the 2008 financial crisis.  
Regardless, of which view of the usefulness of corporate donations is correct, there is 
evidence that donations bestow benefits and costs on the donor, and thus it is conceivable that a 
donor analyst might be similar impacted. Based on the past work in this literature, two 
conclusions which are important to my work emerge. First, political donations do influence 
politicians such that firms receive benefits; whether these benefits are commensurate with their 
spending is an ongoing debate. Second, political leanings of the analyst and the political situation 
in Washington influence analyst behavior.  
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Section 3. Hypotheses 
 
Given this, I hypothesize that if firms receive benefits from making significant donations 
to political candidates, analysts donating large amounts of money will also benefit. Just as the 
influence of political donations on firm returns is debated in the literature, it is also debatable 
whether politically active analysts will be more or less accurate than non-political analysts. I 
hypothesize that whatever benefits, large or small, an analyst might gain from political 
connectedness, only those analysts who are making substantial contributions will receive any 
benefits. If there are benefits to being a big donor as an analyst, it makes sense that these benefits 
would accrue to the most connected analysts who have given the largest contributions to 
politicians. Throughout this paper, I will group analysts into two categories, Big Donor analysts 
and those who are not Big Donor analysts. In this case, I define a Big Donor to be an analyst 
whose donations to all federally elected candidates in any given year places him (or her) into the 
top 5% of all donors (analysts and otherwise) nationally in any given year. This leads to 
Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1: Analysts that make large political donations will have more accurate earnings 
estimates than other analysts. 
Here large donations are the donations made by Big Donor analysts. The expected 
channel for this hypothesis could be as result of: (1) a valuable information conduit from 
politicians to analysts, or (2) an indicator of unobservable analyst skill and talent which enables 
these analysts to more accurately estimate earnings (e.g. an intuitive understanding of how 
political machinations are likely to be resolved). The information conduit hypothesis makes 
sense in the context of the evidence on individual political contributions provided by 
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Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni (2012), while the idea of political donations being correlated with 
unobservable analyst skill fits with the results of Bonaparte and Kumar (2012). 
An information conduit between analysts and politicians could be a result of an informal 
exchange of donations from the analyst (and perhaps others at his brokerage firm) in return for 
useful political intelligence. Alternatively, it could also be the result of an ongoing social 
relationship between the analyst in question and the politician. This relationship need not be 
based on donations or the passing of political intelligence. Instead, both might be byproducts of 
an existing friendship between two individuals, and the political access that the analyst gains 
from the friendship. For example, Representative Smith may give Analyst Jones political 
intelligence in passing while the two play golf, and because they are friends, Analyst Jones may 
be a regular donor to Representative Smith’s campaign. Assuming analysts do have an 
information conduit to Washington politicians, it is difficult to determine whether that 
information flow is due to a “cash for information” channel or a “friendship for information” 
channel, or a combination of the two.  
Cohen and Malloy (2010) provide the basis for the view that social links and friendship 
between analysts and politicians may enable the passing of political intelligence. They show that 
personal connections among politicians have a significant impact on legislative voting behavior. 
If social association between politicians is enough to influence voting behavior, then it seems 
likely that social interactions may also be sufficient to allow information sharing between 
government officials and private sector analysts. Aslan and Grinstein (2012) provide further 
support for this notion showing that CEOs generate political rents by socializing with politicians 
leading to higher CEO compensation and increased firm operating performance. Kostovetsky 
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(2010) finds similar important benefits to firms having politically connected board members 
during the 2008 financial crisis. 
In contrast to the view that information might pass to analysts as a result of friendship 
with politicians, some past work has shown that political donations are made primarily for the 
purpose of gaining short term benefits. This type of action by analysts is consistent with a 
“campaign contributions for information” style relationship. Hersch, Netter and Pope (2008) find 
that political contributions are made by firms in order to take advantage of short term 
opportunities, and not as a means of building long-term political capital. Ovtchinnikov and 
Pantaleoni (2012) show that individuals make political contributions with strategic objectives in 
mind, particularly by targeting politicians with power to provide economic benefits to the 
individual. Garner, Kim, and Yore (2012) and Belo, Gala, and Li (2013) both find further 
evidence that allegiance to a particular political party and long standing relationships with certain 
politicians are not as important as having ties to the politicians in power at any given time. 
In this dissertation, I restrict myself to analyzing whether any increased accuracy by big 
donor analysts is due to a politician-analyst information conduit, or if it is due to political 
donations being correlated with increased unobservable skill as an analyst. I term these two 
channels “information conduit” and “unobservable skill” going forward. I examine evidence on 
these channels beginning in Table IV.5  
Assuming that Big Donor analysts are more accurate than other analysts, then regardless 
of which of the channels (information conduit or unobservable skill) is correct, it is likely that a 
stronger series of past forecasts will lead to improved future accuracy. If accuracy is primarily a 
result of time invariant analyst skill, then one would expect that analysts who previously have 
bene quite accurate will continue to be accurate. Similarly, if an information conduit is the 
                                                          
5
 All tables throughout this dissertation may be found in Appendix I at the end of the document. 
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primary driver of my results, then it is likely that the existence of past access to privileged 
information will also lead to future privileged information. Evidence on this is provided by 
Cohen, Coval and Malloy (2010) who show that changes in the leadership of congressional 
committees have a dramatic influence on the success of firms that are economically linked to the 
actions of the committee in question. Thus if the information conduit is responsible for any 
improvement in analyst earnings estimates, then it is likely a politician will have more 
information about a firm that is connected with the government. Thus analysts in this scenario 
should have time-persistent access to better information. This leads to hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 2: Analysts who have been more accurate previously will continue to be more 
accurate independent of Big Donor status. 
There are many possible reasons for analyst accuracy beyond Big Donor status, including 
innate ability, interest in news and current events (a la Bonaparte and Kumar, 2013), and analyst 
learning. It is important then to establish that any accuracy increase due to being a Big Donor is 
not endogenously determined by an unobserved factor derived from some sort of skill. Assuming 
support is found for hypotheses 1 and 2, this would suggest with reasonable confidence that 
analysts making significant donations are more accurate than other analysts conditional upon 
skill or learning (either time-varying or otherwise). So, assuming this holds, the next step is to 
look for evidence surrounding which of the two channels is responsible for the improved 
accuracy. This leads to hypotheses 3 and 4. 
Hypothesis 3: If the information conduit is the driver of higher accuracy among Big Donors, 
then Big Donor analysts will become more accurate in their predictions as the time between 
donation and analyst estimate forecast decreases.  
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If an information conduit channel between politicians and analysts exists and is 
identifiable through political donations, then the strength of this information channel is likely to 
be highly dependent on the time between a donation and the analyst’s estimate. This would be 
true either if a cash for information style transaction is being conducted, or if a politician and 
analyst are close friends. Thus if improved analyst estimates are driven by information flow from 
politicians, the improvement should be negatively related to the time between the donation and 
when the analyst receives the information. Further, since analysts have an incentive to put this 
information out as early as possible to help their clients and beat other analysts, it is likely that 
the time between an analyst receiving information, and publishing an estimate is brief. For this 
reason, I include the absolute value of the time between a Big Donor analyst’s donation and their 
estimate as a control variable.6 
In contrast, if analyst donations are merely a proxy for an unobservable skill based on 
political interest which makes analysts better at predicting firm earnings, then it is unlikely that 
there would be a significant relationship between the time interval in an analyst donation and 
estimate, and the accuracy of that estimate. Thus, I interpret significance on this variable as 
evidence in favor of the information conduit channel. That said, evidence in favor of the 
information conduit channel does not rule out effects from the unobservable skill channel – it is 
entirely possible that both channels may operate simultaneously. I test Hypothesis 3 beginning in 
Table IV. 
Hypothesis 4: Big Donor analysts with a geographic link to a politician will be more accurate 
than analysts who have no obvious geographic link to the politician receiving the donation. 
                                                          
6
 Breaking out time donations into time before and time after an earnings estimate as little effect on my main results 
which is intuitive given that it is not clear if an analyst needs to “pay” for the information before he receives it, or 
after he receives it and assesses its value. In fact both arrangements probably could make sense depending on the 
individual circumstances. 
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Information flow between politicians and analysts is likely to be significantly easier if the 
politician represents the state in which the analyst lives and works. This type of geographic link 
would facilitate meetings and make a friendship between the two considerably more likely. In 
contrast, increased accuracy driven by unobservable skill related to political interest is unlikely 
to be affected by geographic proximity between the analyst and the politician. Therefore, I 
include a binary variable for analysts making significant donations to politicians in the same 
state. I interpret positive significance on this coefficient as evidence in favor of the information 
conduit channel over the unobservable skill channel. Again, it is important to be clear that both 
channels may be in operation simultaneously. 
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Section 4. Data and Methodology 
 
This dissertation requires data on analysts’ political donations. This data can be obtained 
from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) filings on the political contributions of all US 
citizens to all political candidates and political action committees from January 1992 through 
November 2012. These data are restricted to donations of $100 or more to a single candidate and 
include donations above this magnitude to all candidates and PACs at all levels of federal 
elections.  Although it requires a substantial amount of hand collection and later hand matching 
based on analyst names and employers, using data directly from the FEC filings results in 
substantially more complete data than alternative “packaged” sources of data.  
I classify candidates and PACs as Republican, Democrat, or Independent based on the 
FEC filings and data gathered online by hand and via the FEC. I also gather data from IBES on 
analyst earnings estimates. These data include all earnings estimates for all analysts from 1992 to 
2012. I allow only one earnings estimate per analyst per firm per quarter by dropping all 
estimates that occur before the analyst’s last one for a given company in a given quarter. While 
this may be surprising given by use of estimate timing as an implicit source of information from 
political sources or otherwise, the presumption here is that any past but still useful information 
impounded into estimates is also impounded into current estimates as well. Since I can only test 
the validity of estimates when earnings are released, the use of stale estimates would necessarily 
bias my results. The practice of dropping such past stale estimates is very common throughout 
much of the analyst earnings forecast literature. The purpose in doing this is to remove stale 
earnings estimates since many analysts will update their estimates multiple times over the course 
of a quarter. I use the IBES master names file to match the name of each analyst with the 
indentifying code in IBES which is linked to the analyst’s past estimates. I then combine the 
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FEC donations data with the IBES estimates data using a name and firm matching algorithm. 
This matches the two datasets based on the name of the donor in the FEC database and his 
reported employer with the analyst name in the IBES names database. Where possible, I 
supplement data in the names file with information gathered on the internet including the 
brokerage firm of the analyst. I check all of the algorithm’s matches by hand for the final sample 
and for robustness, I also remove all donors that do not report their occupation to the FEC as 
being related to equity research (e.g. equity analyst, banker, analyst, etc.), and those where the 
donor is not located in the same state as his brokerage firm’s headquarters. My results are 
unchanged by these additional screens, but I do not use them in my baseline estimates because 
the occupation variable is optional for FEC reporting, and many of the donors do not report their 
specific occupation as a result, and non-reporting is unlikely to be randomized. The effect of 
using these screens would be to shrink my sample dramatically and limit my ability to perform 
certain tests with fixed effects due to a lack of time series observations. The results using these 
screens are not included in this text, but are available from the author upon request. 
Data on government connections with firms are based on the Compustat segments data 
and industry codes from Compustat. In the segments data, if the government is listed as a 
customer consuming more than 10% of the firm’s sales, then I classify the firm as having a 
government connection. Similarly, I classify a firm as having a government connection if it is in 
a regulated industry including tobacco and alcohol, financials and insurance, utilities, telecom, 
pharmaceuticals, healthcare, autos (for the period 2008-2012), mining, or oil exploration. 
  
16 
 
Section 5. Results 
 
I begin by examining the donation statistics for my sample. There are tens-of-thousands 
of individual contributions by analysts during the period 1992-2012, however many of these are 
small individual donations made to many different politicians and political action committees 
supporting politicians. Thus to determine analyst’s status as a donor in any given year, I sum up 
all of their donations to all federally elected politicians. These individual contributions yield a 
total of 47,816 quarterly earnings estimates for a given firm by analysts who donate at least $100 
to at least one individual politician in that given year. This is roughly 5% of total 917,259 
specific firm earnings estimates by analysts during the sample period. 
The average contribution for all analysts who are donors is $2,697, while the 95th 
percentile is $10,000 and median is $1,000. There are 5,326 firm-quarter observations with an 
earnings estimate by a current Big Donor analyst. However, there is considerable variation in 
these analyst donations both over time and within a given year as many analysts give only a 
nominal sum (or nothing at all), while others donate thousands of dollars. Total contributions by 
all analysts at a given firm have a mean of ~$183,000 a year, with total donations by analysts 
alone at the 95th percentile of firms each year giving in excess of $1 million on average. These 
figures are deceptive however in that they are skewed upwards by the numerous analysts at large 
firms donating as a group as evidenced by the smaller (though still economically significant) 
median donation of $50.913. Based on these data, I classify analysts in the top 5% of all donors 
each year as being “Politically Connected” and Big Donors. These major donor analysts are 
identified with a binary variable in all tests and tables going forward. Thus the control group in 
each of my tests is all analysts, donors and non-donors, who do not donate enough to fall into the 
Big Donor category in any given year. 
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An analyst may move in and out of the Big Donor category each year based on their own 
contributions and what the 5% cutoff is each year. Predictably, this cutoff increases consistently 
between 1992 and 2012. The rationale here is that connectedness is likely to be based on relativel 
contributions rather than absolute contributions. In my tests, I identify analysts who give enough 
to fall into the Big Donor category as those analysts most likely to gain an advantage from 
political relationships. I do not claim that all of these analysts gain advantage from their 
donations, nor do I claim that none of those analysts not in the Big Donor category have any 
politically based advantages. Instead, the Big Donor category is merely a convenient threshold to 
identify the analysts most likely to have political connections. My results are robust to the use of 
a top 1% threshold for Big Donor analysts instead as well as the top 10% of analysts (though 
they are weaker in the latter case).  
Throughout most tests, I use the Big Donor category rather than simple level of donations 
because of non-linearity in the effect of donations. It is unlikely that somewhat donating $20,000 
has precisely twice the political advantage as someone donating $10,000 and ten times the 
advantage of someone donating $2,000. Instead, it seems more likely that up to some certain 
threshold, donations buy a donor no political advantage, and beyond this threshold, they buy 
increasing amounts of advantage. I examine this assumption in Appendix Tables III and IV and 
find support for it. Given that the average House Representative who won an election raised $1.4 
million in 2012, and considerably less in earlier years, even a single donation of $5,000 is a 
significant help in meeting fundraising goals. 
[Insert Table I here]7 
 
Table II provides descriptive statistics on control variables and earnings accuracy for the 
sample of analysts and the firms they cover. Panel A shows variables based on all analysts and 
                                                          
7
 All tables throughout this dissertation may be found in Appendix I at the end of the document. 
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the firms they cover regardless of whether they make any kind of donation during the sample 
period, while Panel B examines only those analysts falling into the Big Donor category. 
Panel A reveals that over the sample of roughly 8900,000 analyst-firm-quarter 
observations, the mean analyst price scale accuracy (PSA) is -6.85. This measure is defined as 
the natural log of the absolute value of (earnings estimate – actual earnings)/firm share price. 
Thus a perfectly accurate estimate would have a PSA of 08. I use natural logs in this measure as 
the logarithmic function is a better fit to the data than a simple linear function. This is evident 
both in a simple review of the means as well as observing that the R-squared values in natural 
log-based regressions are up to ten times as high as in simple linear regressions. Further, this 
specification makes sense in that intuitively it is not clear that a $0.10 miss on an $8 stock is 10X 
a bad as a $0.10 miss on an $80 stock.  
The average accuracy is -3.18 which is defined as the natural log of the absolute value of 
(earnings estimate – actual earnings)/actual earnings. Again, the natural log function is used here 
because it is a better fit with the data. In the case of both accuracy and PSA, if the natural log 
function is removed, the R-squared values go down significantly and the coefficients become 
less significant or frequently insignificant depending on the regression in question. 
An important implication of these definitions of accuracy and PSA is that negative 
coefficients mean greater accuracy since increasingly negative log numbers mean a term that is 
closer to 0 (i.e. ln(0.01) = -4.61 and ln(0.02) = -3.91, and 0.01 is closer to 0 and hence more 
accurate than 0.02). This is the opposite of the coefficients on Above Median Accuracy where 
positive coefficients indicate greater accuracy (i.e. greater likelihood of being above average on 
                                                          
8
 This procedure necessarily causes me to lose observations where PSA = 0, but this cannot be helped, and I view it 
as worthwhile given the improved fit that the specification provides with the data. Fortunately, perfect accuracy is 
relatively rare in my sample. The use of this PSA variable without the natural log term leads to mixed significance 
on my coefficients of interest, but a much lower R-squared value in all cases. 
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accuracy). Approximately 10% of all donors forecasts for a given company in a given year are 
classified as being made by a Big Donor. This may seem surprising given the 5% cut-off 
threshold for being a Big Donor, but it is worth remembering that analysts are much better paid 
than the average American, and hence it is logical that their donations would be larger than 
average since income is probably positively correlated with donation propensity and amount. An 
analyst who is a Big Donor is also a donor. Thus the interpretation of Big Donor is that it is the 
marginal effect over and above simply being a donor from donating a large amount.  
Panel B shows that analysts classified as Big Donor in a given year, make more accurate 
estimates in that year based on PSA than other analysts. Big Donor analysts are also more likely 
to fall into the upper half of the accuracy distribution as evidenced by the Above Median 
Accuracy variable. Panel B shows that 55% of Big Donor analysts fall above the median in the 
distribution of earnings estimate accuracy. (The t-statistics on these univariate accuracy 
differences are not statistically significant due to the wide range of variation in estimates 
between analysts.) 
[Insert Table II here] 
Table III begins my main multivariate analysis. Here I examine the effects of being a Big 
Donor after accounting for covered firm specific variables like debt burden, market value, cash-
holdings, and book value. This requires that I have data on all of these variables for firms in each 
period. Further, because I use natural logs with each of these variables as is customary, this 
results in many missing or undefined variables for firms that have no debt for example or hold no 
recorded cash. Due these factors, my sample sizes are considerably smaller here than in later 
regressions. 
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In columns 1, 3, and 5, I examine the impact of being politically connected on PSA, 
Accuracy, and the Above Median Accuracy measure. In each case, as the Big Donor variable 
shows, analyst accuracy increases with Big Donor status. Again, to reiterate, the negative 
coefficients in columns 1 and 3 are indicative of greater accuracy as the dependent variables are 
PSA and Accuracy, as is the positive coefficient in column 5 where the dependent variable is 
Above Median Accuracy. Each regression controls for the time between the forecast and the 
earnings announcement (Days to Earnings), whether the firm is connected to the government 
(Government Supplier), and whether the forecast is a long-term one made about an earnings that 
will occur in a future quarter or a short-term one made about the current quarter’s earnings. Most 
of the variables are highly statistically significant which makes sense intuitively – it is logical for 
example that analysts making estimates closer to an earnings announcement are commonly 
updating their existing estimates to take into account new information, and that long-term 
earnings forecasts are less likely to be accurate than short-term ones.  
Columns 2, 4, and 6 examine not only whether an analyst is politically connected, but 
also a measure of the strength of that connection in the form of the temporal proximity of a Big 
Donor’s donation and his forecast. In each case, I use a dummy variable to indicate if a donation 
falls within a window of 0-30 days, 30-90 days, 90-180 days, or 180-365 days from the date of 
the analyst’s forecast. This last window is omitted which makes the Big Donor variable in 
columns 2, 4, and 6 essentially an indicator for an analyst being a Big Donor and having made a 
donation in this most distant time frame. All other non-politically connected analysts have a zero 
value for all of these windows (hence the reason for this specification as it does not limit my 
sample as a numeric measure of days between donation and forecast would). The values on these 
variables suggest that the more recent the donation the stronger the resulting accuracy is for the 
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politically connected analyst. Those analysts with donations beyond 90 days, have limited 
accuracy, and that after controlling for this effect, the remaining effect of being a big donor is if 
anything deleterious to an analyst’s accuracy. This may be due to overconfidence in past 
information, or given the mixed significance on the coefficients, simply a spurious result. The 
overriding significance in columns 2, 4, and 6 is on the fact that even after controlling for firm 
specific characteristics, Big Donors who have made a recent donation are substantially more 
accurate than other analysts. 
In addition, the variables Past PSA, Past Accuracy, and Past Above Median Accuracy all 
are various measures of an individual analysts past success in making accurate estimates. The 
coefficients on each of these indicates that as an individual’s past accuracy increases, their 
current period accuracy also increases. The positive sign here in columns 1 thru 4 indicate that 
higher levels of past accuracy and PSA (lower accuracy) lead to higher current levels of both 
(again lower accuracy). The opposite is true of the Above Median Accuracy number. Here higher 
past Above Median Accuracy (more accurate) leads to a higher current level of Above Median 
Accuracy (again, more accurate).  
While the coefficients on the firm characteristics variables are statistically significant, 
they are not especially meaningful or useful in the context of understanding the effects of 
political connectedness on analyst accuracy. Given this, and the significant limitations they 
impose on my sample size, I do not use them in later regression analysis. Additionally, as the 
current table shows, the R-squareds in all regressions are relatively low. This is perhaps a 
function of the fact that I am not trying to explain estimates or actual earnings (both of which 
yield much higher R-squared if they are used as dependent variable in these regressions), but the 
difference between the estimate and the actual earnings. This residual unexplained surprise in 
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earnings is very difficult to project or explain (if it weren’t analysts would adjust their estimates 
after all), and this fact accounts for the relatively low R-squareds throughout this regression and 
those that follow. Nonetheless, I have also endeavored to be as conservative as possible in 
reporting these R-squared values so as not to present undue confidence in explanatory power of 
the models presented. In each regression, I use the adjusted R-squared and the overall R-squared 
which are lower than alternative measures.   
[Insert Table III here] 
 
In Table IV, I set out to examine if political connectedness impacts forecast accuracy 
after controlling for time effects with a series of year and quarter binary variables and with 
covered firm fixed effects. The latter effects, found in columns 2, 4, and 6, allow me to drop the 
firm characteristics I used previously without diminishing my overall sample size. The sample 
sizes do vary based upon the dependent variable in question largely because of the nature of 
logarithmic functions and the occurrence of a firm having actual earnings of $0 in any given 
quarter (which of course makes the accuracy variable non-existent since it requires dividing by 
actual earnings). In each regression though, the sample sizes are all above 700,000 representing a 
healthy portion of the available ~900,000 observations.  
As before, the immediate conclusion that comes from the table is that Big Donor analysts 
are more accurate. This holds with tremendous significance in all specifications and using all 
three dependent variable measures of accuracy. It is interesting that in some of the regressions, 
the Donor variable (which indicates an analyst makes donations above $100 in that year to at 
least one candidate), is statistically significant and suggests less accuracy. It is possible that this 
is a function of political bias from these analysts affecting their judgment about certain firms 
(e.g. Democrats covering defense stocks or Republican’s covering green-energy firms), but a 
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more systematic explanation of this result is beyond the scope of this dissertation as these 
analysts are axiomatically not politically-connected. 
Interestingly, the effects of an estimate being made prior to Reg FD or during the period 
August thru November (represented by the Political Season variable), both have negative 
impacts on accuracy. While the exact reason for these effects is impossible to pinpoint, one 
explanation is that prior to Reg FD, analysts had alternative sources of information such as 
access to management and thus Big Donor analysts gained less benefit (or were not looking for a 
earnings forecasting benefit) as a result of their donations. Similarly, it is possible that as 
elections approach and media begins greater scrutiny of federally elected officials, and officials 
face greater demands on their time, they have less ability or inclination to pass along valuable 
information to politically connected analysts. This is mere speculation of course, but the 
explanation does fit with the facts at hand. Regardless, the results are consistent with politically 
connected analysts making more accurate forecasts whether thru the friendship or information 
conduit channels. 
[Insert Table IV here] 
 While Table IV was primarily a test of H1, the effects of political connectedness on 
accuracy, in Table V, I move to testing H3 by examining the extent to which the time between a 
Big Donor’s donation and their forecast impacts their accuracy. As in Table III, I break down 
this time into four different windows: 0-30 Days, 30-90 Days, 90-180 Days, and 180-365 Days. 
Again the purpose in structuring the test this way is to avoid having the entire non-Big Donors 
group drop out of the regression as their value for days between a donation as a Big Donor and 
the earnings forecast is non-existent. 
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 As in Table IV, columns 1, 3, and 5 focus control simply for time effects through year 
and quarter dummies, while columns 2, 4, and 6 include controls on time effects and include firm 
fixed effects. In both specifications and under all three dependent variable measures of accuracy 
the table shows that the primary improvement for Big Donor accuracy comes from those donors 
making donations within the last 90 days. Donors making donations beyond that point in time are 
statistically more accurate. This is supportive of Hypothesis 3 and suggests that recent 
engagement with politicians via the donation mechanism is an important driver of improved 
accuracy. It is also possible that political connections decay rapidly over time and that donors 
who have not been recently engaged with a politician find that their information advantage is 
outdated. Both of these channels would be consistent with the view of politically connected 
analysts gaining valuable information via their connections through either the friendship channel 
or the information conduit channel. These results do not preclude an analyst specific skill effect 
driving my findings, but the effect would need to be time varying and correlated with donation 
propensity to explain these particular results. 
Overall, as in Table III, the conclusion from Tables IV and V is that Big Donor analysts 
appear to be more accurate, and this accuracy is stronger when the time interval between a 
donation and the analyst estimate is small.9 This latter fact is evidence in favor of the information 
conduit channel of analyst accuracy. 
[Insert Table V here] 
In Table VI, I examine the effect of political donations on analyst accuracy after 
controlling for analyst fixed effects. In essence, this lets us interpret the coefficient on Big Donor 
as the effect on a specific analyst of becoming a Big Donor analyst. (Again Big Donor status is a 
year-specific effect and a given analyst might be a Big Donor last year, and then not a Big Donor 
                                                          
9
 Similar results hold when using analyst specific time-trends in place of the current specification. 
25 
 
this year.) This specification therefore controls for any unobservable analyst characteristics, and 
is a direct test of the unobservable skill channel versus the information conduit channel. If some 
analysts have specific personality characteristics or other unobserved attributes that that both 
increase the probability of being a large political donor and being an accurate earnings predictor, 
then it is likely that these effects are largely time-invariant. However, even if the effects do vary 
with time, as long as there development of accuracy does not correspond closely to the choice to 
donate to a politician, then a regression using analyst fixed effects and a Big Donor dummy 
should be able to provide evidence to distinguish between the hypothesized channels.   
 Table VI shows that analysts become more accurate in the years they are classified as Big 
Donor as evidenced by the statistically significant coefficients in columns 1, 3, and 5 which are 
negative, negative, and positive respectively with all three columns indicating greater accuracy. 
Additionally, the binary variables related to donation windows in columns 2, 4, and 6 are 
statistically significant. Again, the omitted binary variable is for those analysts making donations 
360+ days ago meaning that the other variables are interpreted against that standard. The table 
shows that as the time interval between donation and estimate shrinks, each specific analyst 
becomes more accurate compared with past estimates by that same analyst. I view this as 
compelling evidence that analysts are more accurate when they are big donors, and this could be 
interpreted as being in favor of the information conduit channel. Of course, this does not 
necessarily mean that the unobservable skill channel isn’t contributing to the broader result that 
Big Donor analysts are more accurate, but it does suggest that this channel is not the predominate 
driver. It is also strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 3.  
 These findings do support the notion that analyst skill is time varying however, and may 
in fact evolve over time. The various measures of past accuracy (Past PSA, Past Accuracy, and 
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Past Median Accuracy) are all statistically significant and indicate that analysts who have 
recently made accurate forecasts continue to make more accurate forecasts in the current period. 
Since this measure updates over time, it is not a fixed effect (and hence does not drop out of the 
regression). The highly statistically significant coefficient can be interpreted as support for either 
analyst learning, or a “momentum” style phenomenon where at a given juncture in time, an 
analyst has a particularly solid understanding of what is going on at a company for unobserved 
reasons. Exploring this further is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but it is noteworthy at this 
stage. 
 [Insert Table VI here] 
 In Table VII, I examine the connection between analyst estimates and political donations 
with industry fixed effects included. In columns 1 through 6, once again the Big Donor 0-30 and 
30-90 days to donation coefficients are statistically significant and indicate greater accuracy by 
these analysts even after controlling for the usual set of regression variables and industry fixed 
effects.  
In each column, I examine the effect of making donations to a congressman who sits on a 
committee that regulates the industry in which one of the analyst’s covered firms operates. Given 
that these congressmen sit on the committee supervising the industry of the covered firm, they 
will certainly have relevant information that would impact the firm and its earnings going 
forward. As a result, if an analyst can establish a connection and information flow with that 
congressman, then they will have superior information regarding future earnings. Thus the 
Committee-Link variable is an important indicator for whether information is flowing to analysts 
from congressional politicians who have very specific and valuable information. As the table 
shows, Committee-Link is statistically significant, and the coefficients each column indicate that 
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analysts are more accurate when they are major donors (i.e. Big Donor) to committee members 
regulating covered firms of the analyst. This evidence is supportive of either the friendship or 
information conduit channels (though again it does not preclude the possibility of analyst skill 
playing a role and indeed the previously observed “momentum” effects for analysts do still 
hold).  
In addition, I now examine the effect of a geographic link between analyst and donor 
recipient. This geographic link is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst works in the state that 
the donor recipient represents in congress. The interpretation on this coefficient is the marginal 
effect of a Big Donor analyst being geographically linked to the donor recipient in question. This 
is a potentially important effect because a geographic link between the two makes it much more 
plausible that the politician socializes (e.g. plays golf) with the analyst. Thus the presence of 
geographic link is probably an important prerequisite to information sharing through a friendship 
for information style channel.  
The evidence on the geographic link is mixed. While in each specification the geographic 
link variable has the right sign, only in columns 1 and 6 is it statistically significant. In the other 
cases, the variable while somewhat close to significant is not of sufficient magnitude to clearly 
indicate that a geographic link has a favorable impact on analyst accuracy. Thus the evidence is 
mixed on whether geographical proximity is an important contributor to the Big Donor improved 
accuracy effect. Hypothesis 4 is not clearly supported by the current data. This might be 
explained by a variety of explanations including the fact that most analysts live in the northeast 
around New York City, but may still retain ties to places they have lived previously or people 
they went to college with.  
[Insert Table VII here] 
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Table VIII is an examination of the sample of all Big Donors around the time they gain 
that designation. Here the specification includes a dummy variable for those about to become Big 
Donors. I measure the difference in accuracy between an analyst in the year before he becomes a 
Big Donor, and his own accuracy after he becomes a Big Donor. The sample size is much 
smaller here since I am only examining those analysts who are Big Donors at some point during 
my sample period. I do not use the full set of independent variables in Table VIII or Table IX as 
the reduced nature of the sample makes many of them inappropriate and the focus of the test is 
on testing for a heterogeneity issue (as I explain below). 
The positive and significant coefficients in columns 1 and 2 along with the negative and 
significant coefficient in column 3 on Pre-Donation*Big Donor suggest that in the year before 
an analyst becomes a big donor they are markedly less accurate than after the analyst becomes a 
Big Donor. To the extent that Big Donor is a valid proxy for political connectedness, this 
suggests that being politically connected has an immediate effect in terms of increasing the 
forecasting ability of the analysts in question. This lackluster pre-Big Donor status forecasting 
ability is still substantially mitigated by the past accuracy of the analyst suggesting that skill 
(time-varying or otherwise) is still an important determinant of forecasting success. 
[Insert Table VIII here] 
 Similarly in Table IX, I examine how analysts fare in the year after they cease to be a Big 
Donor in comparison to the period when they were a Big Donor. Here the presumption is that 
whatever information benefits the analyst gleaned as a result of his donations have now been 
eliminated. This might occur because the politician he was friends with retired or lost an 
election, or it might be that the analyst changed company coverage to a firm where political 
connections no longer provided useful information, or simply that the politician had only a 
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limited amount of useful information which has now grown stale. In any event, the analysts in 
Table IX have chosen to stop being Big Donors. 
As before, Table IX suggests that analysts who lose their politically connected status see 
lower levels of accuracy compared with their past forecasts. This result is highly statistically 
significant though it is offset by the analyst’s past skill in forecasting. The magnitude of the 
coefficients suggest that the effect of losing political connectedness is greater than the past skill 
effect which in turn suggests an overall decline in accuracy after an analyst ceases to be a Big 
Donor regardless of his improved accuracy during the period in question. 
I view this test as a natural way to allay concerns over heterogeneity in my sample. If one 
believes that analysts who make better forecasts are more successful and earn a higher salary and 
this predisposes them to donate more money to politicians, then it stands to reason that these 
analysts should be more accurate prior to becoming donors. Similarly, it is difficult to explain 
why analysts should become less accurate after they stop being a donor if Big Donor status were 
a by-product of greater accuracy rather than the other way around. On the whole then, the 
implication of Table IX is that the increase in accuracy is an ipso facto result of the donations 
(and what the political connectedness they are proxying for).  
[Insert Table IX here] 
Table X expanded the results from Table IX by considering the full sample of analysts in a 
difference-in-differences framework. As the previous sample of past, present, and future Big 
Donors, the D-I-D tests shown in Table X reveal that future and past Big Donor analysts are less 
accurate compared with their own accuracy when they later become Big Donors. This test is a 
powerful indicator that donation status directly impacts individual analysts regardless of their 
other characteristics. Columns 1 through 3 reveal that future Big Donors are less accurate than 
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they will become after they attain Big Donor status. Columns 4-6 reveals that Big Donors are 
less accurate after they cease to hold that status.  
 This may lead one to wonder why an analyst would stop donating to politicians if it will 
simply result in their making less accurate earnings forecasts. That question though assumes that 
earnings forecast accuracy is not in fact dependent on a third unobservable factor such as the 
existence of useful political intelligence held by a politician willing to pass such information. 
Thus analysts might stop donating because a politician they had a close relationship with retires, 
or because the politician changes committees and subsequently has less useful information, or 
simply because the analyst not longer finds the politician as helpful as he once did. Regardless of 
the rationale, it is clear that in the full sample of analysts, donors and non-donors, Big Donor 
analysts are less accurate both before and after they attain that status than they are while they 
hold the status.  
[Table X here] 
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Section 6. Robustness Analysis 
 
My robustness checks mainly focus on four principle points of concern. The first point of 
concern is that my findings are a result of spurious correlation between dependent and/or 
independent variables chosen for my regressions. Second, one might be concerned that an 
alternative measure of political connectedness such as a simple annual donor dollar amount 
would render my results inert, or be as powerful a predictor of accuracy as the binary Big Donor 
status. Third, there may be concerns that my results are a function of the Big Donor threshold 
choice. And fourth, some may wonder if my results are driven by donations to one political party 
or the other, especially given the consistent significance on the binary variables for a 
Democratically-controlled Congress and a Democratic President. I have already attempted to 
address these concerns in the tests above, but these additional robustness checks may help to 
alleviate doubt. 
Table XI addresses the concerns over correlations between variables in my regressions by 
detailing the correlation coefficients between various control variables. The table shows that Big 
Donor analysts are significantly correlated with greater accuracy (lower levels of PSA and 
Accuracy, and higher levels of Above Median Accuracy, all of which correspond to greater 
accuracy overall). The table also shows that Big Donor analysts are significantly positively 
correlated with covered firms having a connection with the government (Gov’t Supplier). The 
various proxies for forecast accuracy are all highly correlated suggesting that they are all 
effective measures of the same overall effect; analyst accuracy. The other control variables often 
share some significant correlation, but not to the degree that multicolinearity is likely to be a 
major concern in multivariate analysis. 
[Table XI here] 
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In order to address the possibility that my results might fall apart using alternative 
measures of political connectedness, particularly in light of my choice logarithm-based 
dependent variables, I re-run my analysis using both donation quartiles (a broader measure of 
political connectedness), and thousands of USD donated (a more variable and precise measure, 
albeit one subject to inflation concerns).  
As Table XII shows, the results continue to support the view that political connectedness 
can be a significant driver of forecast accuracy in sell-side analysts. Under each measure of 
accuracy, both the top donor quartile and the coefficient on donation amount show up as 
statistically significant with signs in the correct direction. The R-squared values are slightly 
lower than in the comparable Table IV above suggesting that these measures are not quite as 
good a fit with the broader data. Of course since Big Donor analysts make up a small portion of 
the overall sample, this diminishment in R-squared values is small. These general results also 
hold with a variety of other specifications including alternative fixed effects. 
[Table XII here] 
Building on Table XII and to address the possibility that my results are due to a form of 
data snooping based on my choice of Big Donor threshold, in Table XIII, I break down donations 
based on the respective donation percentiles. Importantly these variables are annual percentiles 
thresholds, and this structure helps to address the possibility that donation inflation plays a 
significant role in biasing results when using an absolute dollar volume of donations. Further, by 
breaking down the sample into five-percentile blocks, this table addresses the possibility that the 
Big Donor threshold should be winder or narrower. As the table reveals, the bulk of the test 
significance is in the top 10% of all donations (with the 90-85th percentile block getting close to 
traditional significance in some cases). While this result suggests that the Big Donor threshold 
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might be valid if expanded from the top 5% of all donations to the top 10% of all donations in a 
given year, I view sticking with the top 5% as a more conservative strategy. This is because if 
anything if this specification biases me against finding results by including potentially politically 
connected analysts in with those analysts who are not politically connected. 
[Table XIII here] 
Finally, in Table XIV, I examine whether my results are driven by donations to one 
particular political party. Here, I break out annual donations in thousands of dollars between 
Democrats and Republicans. The results show that donations to both parties lead to statistically 
significant increases in accuracy, but in two out of three cases, the magnitude of the coefficients 
on Democratic donations are larger. Given that I control for the time dimension as well as 
including firm fixed effects, this result is unlikely to be driven by simple time-varying effects. 
Instead this result provides (admittedly limited) evidence that donors to Democratic candidates 
may receive better information (or be better able to interpret that information) than donors to 
Republican candidates. Of course it is also possible that these results are a product of Democrats 
being more effective in advancing their preferred policies over the last decade than Republicans 
which would render their information more valuable. Thus, it is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions about the channel for any difference in coefficient magnitudes, but it is clear on the 
whole that donations to both political parties are beneficial to sell-side analysts.  
[Table XIV here] 
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Section 7. Conclusion 
 
 In this dissertation, I show that political connections are one mechanism by which 
analysts can improve their earnings accuracy. These results hold in the post-Reg FD period, and 
are not driven by simple association between greater levels of political activity and higher levels 
of analyst accuracy. Instead, analysts are more accurate when they make substantial 
contributions to politicians. This result may be due to these analysts explicitly trading campaign 
contributions for information, or it may be due to the analyst simply having a social relationship 
with the politician. Accuracy is greater for analysts who make donations closer to their earnings 
estimate release date, those who make donations to elected officials who sit on committees 
which regulate the firm, and perhaps when the analyst and politician have a geographic link, 
though this evidence is mixed. Importantly, these results hold after accounting analyst skill, 
which by itself is a significant determinant of future accuracy by analysts. In addition, my results 
hold after controlling for various control variables and fixed effects for analysts and firms, as 
well as binary variables for years, quarters, and exchange. Further, the increased accuracy holds 
after comparing analysts making significant donations with their own pre- or post-donation year 
accuracy. 
 My results demonstrate one mechanism by which analysts continue to provide value to 
investors, and they provide a possible reason for the rapid rise in the political intelligence 
industry over the last decade. While most analysts do not have the political connections 
necessary to gain useful information for clients, it is possible that other mechanisms for gaining 
useful information exist and that analysts engaging in unconventional research activities that may 
provide significant value to investors. I leave the investigation of alternative means of useful 
information gathering to future researchers.  
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Table I: Univariate and Descriptive Statistics on Analyst Political Donations 
Average campaign spending by winning House member in a 2 year campaign ending in 2012 was $1,439,997, while in the 
Senate (6 year campaign) it was $9,782,702. These figures have more risen by a factor of three since 1992.Single Contributions 
are one contribution by a single analyst. Analyst yearly contributions are annual contribution amount by a single analyst and are 
made up of one or more single contributions. Analyst yearly contributions to Republicans and Democrats are the contribution 
amounts directed by a single analyst to all members of one party or the other. Analyst total sample contributions are the sum of 
all contributions made by a single analyst throughout the entire 20 year sample period. Analyst total sample contributions to 
Republicans and Democrats are the sum of all contributions to each party for a single analyst during the entire sample period. 
Firm contributions are defined in the same fashion as analyst contributions but with contributions aggregated by brokerage or 
research firm rather than by individual analyst. Firm contributions displayed here include only the donations by analysts and do 
not include any donations by other types of firm employees such as mangers. 
 
  Mean Median 75% 90% 95% 99% Max Obs 
Analyst Contributions (All Analysts) 140.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 250 2,800 146,900 917,259 
Analyst Contributions (Donors Only) 2,697.1 1,000 2,300.0 5,125.0 10,000.0 30,350.0 146,900 47,816 
Analyst Contributions to Republican 
Candidates 691.0 0.0 500.0 2,000.0 3,000.0 9,000.0 48,800 47,816 
Analyst Contributions to Democrat 
Candidates 678.4 0.0 250.0 2,000.0 2,500.0 11,500.0 37,700 47,816 
Firm Yearly Contributions (By Analysts 
Alone) 182,999 50,913 196,990 596,050 1,050,780 1,484,455 1,484,455 47,816 
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Table II: Univariate Statistics on Analyst Estimate Accuracy and Recommendations  
Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) is absolute value of ln((Estimate-Actual)/Share Price), meaning that negative coefficients indicate 
greater accuracy. Accuracy is the relative accuracy of the analyst as defined by the absolute value of ((Estimate-Actual)/Actual, 
and again this means that negative coefficients indicate greater accuracy. Above Median Accuracy is a binary variable equal to 
one if the analyst’s forecast was above the median level of accuracy for the given year. Thus positive coefficients indicate greater 
accuracy here. Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates money to a federal candidate for an election during the 
sample period 1992-2012. Big Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates enough money in a given year to one or 
more candidates to fall into the top 5% of all donors nationally. (Number Range) Days to Donation is a binary variable equal to 1 
if the difference between a Big Donor analyst’s most recent donation and most recent earnings announcement date is equal to that 
range or less. Days to Earnings is the difference in number of days between an analyst’s earnings estimate and the actual earnings 
announcement of the firm. Government Supplier is a binary variable equal to one if the firm being covered by the analyst receives 
more than 10% of sales from the government, or is in a heavily regulated industry. Market Value is the natural log of covered 
firm market capitalization. Debt-to-Assets is the natural log of the covered firm’s debt to assets ratio. Market-to-Book is the 
natural log of the covered firm’s market to book value where book value is the tangible book equity of the firm (tangible assets – 
liabilities). Cash-to-Debt is the ratio of cash holdings of the covered firm to its liabilities. Long Term Forecast is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the estimate is for future quarters’ earnings rather than the current quarter. 
Panel A – All Analysts 
  Mean Median 95th% Standard Deviation Observations 
Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) -6.85 -6.35 -2.43 4.15 912,140 
Accuracy -3.18 -2.44 0.00 3.91 788,482 
Above Median Accuracy 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 917,259 
Actual EPS 1.86 0.31 7.38 50.60 917,259 
Big Donor 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 917,259 
Donor 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.22 917,259 
Days to Donation 110.02 84.00 281.00 87.48 45,816 
Days to Earnings 59.64 65.00 90.00 26.13 917,259 
Government Supplier 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.42 917,259 
Market Value 13.83 13.83 17.17 1.96 902,360 
Debt-to-Assets -0.80 -0.62 -0.05 0.80 245,676 
Market-to-Book 7.18 6.99 10.51 2.07 240,730 
Cash-to-Debt 1.08 0.13 3.97 4.93 244,944 
Long-Term Forecast 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.35 917,259 
Panel B – Big Donor Analysts 
  Mean Median 95th% Standard Deviation Observations 
Price Scaled Accuracy -7.46 -6.45 -2.38 5.29 5,290 
Accuracy -3.98 -2.61 -0.77 4.93 4,590 
Above Median Accuracy 0.55 1.00 1.00 0.50 5,326 
Days to Donation 108.53 85.00 277.00 84.91 5,292 
Days to Earnings 57.15 61.00 90.00 26.42 5,326 
Government Supplier 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.44 5,326 
MV 13.84 13.84 16.93 1.89 5,260 
D2A -0.71 -0.56 0.04 0.76 1,469 
MB 7.02 6.91 10.60 2.06 1,452 
Cash-to-Debt 0.73 0.10 3.33 2.73 1,464 
Long-Term Forecast 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.34 5,326 
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Table III: The Effects of Being a Big Donor on Accuracy 
Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) is absolute value of ln((Estimate-Actual)/Share Price), meaning that negative coefficients indicate 
greater accuracy. Accuracy is the relative accuracy of the analyst as defined by the absolute value of ((Estimate-Actual)/Actual, 
and again this means that negative coefficients indicate greater accuracy. Above Median Accuracy is a binary variable equal to 
one if the analyst’s forecast was above the median level of accuracy for the given year. Thus positive coefficients indicate greater 
accuracy here. Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates money to a federal candidate for an election during the 
sample period 1992-2012. Big Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates enough money in a given year to one or 
more candidates to fall into the top 5% of all donors nationally. (Number Range) Days to Earnings is the difference in number of 
days between an analyst’s earnings estimate and the actual earnings announcement of the firm. Gov’t Supplier*Big Donor is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the analyst is a big donor and covering a government supplier. Political Season is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the observation takes place between August and November.  Past PSA is a variable that is the average of the 
analysts past PSAs for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time. Past Accuracy is a 
variable that is the average of the analysts past accuracies for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five 
estimates back in time. Past Above Median Average is a variable that is the average of the analysts past above median averages 
for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time Government Supplier is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm being covered by the analyst receives more than 10% of sales from the government, or is in a heavily 
regulated industry. Political Season is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs during the period of July through 
November. Pre-Reg FD is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs prior to the year 2002. Long Term Forecast is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the estimate is for future quarters’ earnings rather than the current quarter. Market Value is the 
natural log of covered firm market capitalization. Debt-to-Assets is the natural log of the covered firm’s debt to assets ratio. 
Market-to-Book is the natural log of the covered firm’s market to book value where book value is the tangible book equity of the 
firm (tangible assets – liabilities). Cash-to-Debt is the ratio of cash holdings of the covered firm to its liabilities. Democratic 
Congress is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when Democrats are in control of Congress. 
Democratic President is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when a Democrat is President. Days to 
Donation is a binary variable equal to 1 if the difference between a Big Donor analyst’s most recent donation and most recent 
earnings announcement date is equal to that range or less. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. P-
scores are reported in parentheses. Price Scaled Accuracy Note: A positive Past PSA indicates analyst was less accurate in the 
past, so a positive coefficient makes sense and suggests he will be less accurate in the future.  
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Table III Contd.: 
  PSA PSA Accuracy Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Big Donor -0.708*** 0.509** -0.746*** 0.334 0.068*** -0.0002 (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.180) (0.000) (0.994) 
0 - 30 Days to Big Donor 
Donation 
-2.873***  -2.406***  0.197*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
30 - 90 Days to Big Donor 
Donation 
-1.437***  -1.360***  0.081** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.035) 
90 - 180 Days to Big Donor 
Donation 
-0.553*  -0.535  -0.002 
 (0.100)  (0.118)  (0.966) 
Days to Earnings 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.001*** -0.001*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government Supplier 0.293*** 0.294*** 0.322*** 0.323*** -0.052*** -0.052*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.473) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Season 0.032 0.033 -0.050 -0.049 0.012*** 0.012*** (0.331) (0.310) (0.137) (0.145) (0.003) (0.003) 
Pre-Reg FD -0.733*** -0.733*** 0.132*** 0.131*** -0.018*** -0.018*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Long-Term Forecast 0.512*** 0.511*** -0.651*** -0.652*** 0.247*** 0.247*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past PSA 0.236*** 0.236***    (0.000) (0.000)     
Past Accuracy 0.053*** 0.053***  
  (0.000) (0.000)   
Past Above Median Average   0.144*** 0.144*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.012** -0.012** -0.002*** -0.002*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.003) 
Market Value -0.403*** -0.403*** -0.106*** -0.107*** 0.004*** 0.005*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Debt-to-Assets 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.025* -0.025* 0.012*** 0.012*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.073) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash-to-Debt 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.003 0.003 0.002*** 0.002*** (0.000) (0.002) (0.115) (0.119) (0.000) (0.000) 
Democratic Congress 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.035*** 0.349*** -0.006*** -0.006** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.010) 
Democratic President 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.152*** 0.152*** -0.005* 0.005* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.070) (0.070) 
NASDAQ Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 200,970 200,970 182,012 182,012 212,551 212,551 
Adjusted R-squared (%) 7.46 7.49 1.36 1.39 3.86 3.87 
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Table IV: Impact of Political Donations on Price Scaled Accuracy with Firm FEs 
Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) is absolute value of ln((Estimate-Actual)/Share Price), meaning that negative coefficients indicate 
greater accuracy. Accuracy is the relative accuracy of the analyst as defined by the absolute value of ((Estimate-Actual)/Actual, 
and again this means that negative coefficients indicate greater accuracy. Above Median Accuracy is a binary variable equal to 
one if the analyst’s forecast was above the median level of accuracy for the given year. Thus positive coefficients indicate greater 
accuracy here. Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates money to a federal candidate for an election during the 
sample period 1992-2012. Big Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates enough money in a given year to one or 
more candidates to fall into the top 5% of all donors nationally. (Number Range) Days to Earnings is the difference in number of 
days between an analyst’s earnings estimate and the actual earnings announcement of the firm. Gov’t Supplier*Big Donor is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the analyst is a big donor and covering a government supplier. Political Season is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the observation takes place between August and November.  Past PSA is a variable that is the average of the 
analysts past PSAs for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time. Past Accuracy is a 
variable that is the average of the analysts past accuracies for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five 
estimates back in time. Past Above Median Average is a variable that is the average of the analysts past above median averages 
for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time Government Supplier is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm being covered by the analyst receives more than 10% of sales from the government, or is in a heavily 
regulated industry. Political Season is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs during the period of July through 
November. Pre-Reg FD is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs prior to the year 2002. Long Term Forecast is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the estimate is for future quarters’ earnings rather than the current quarter. Market Value is the 
natural log of covered firm market capitalization. Debt-to-Assets is the natural log of the covered firm’s debt to assets ratio. 
Market-to-Book is the natural log of the covered firm’s market to book value where book value is the tangible book equity of the 
firm (tangible assets – liabilities). Cash-to-Debt is the ratio of cash holdings of the covered firm to its liabilities. Democratic 
Congress is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when Democrats are in control of Congress. 
Democratic President is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when a Democrat is President. Days to 
Donation is a binary variable equal to 1 if the difference between a Big Donor analyst’s most recent donation and most recent 
earnings announcement date is equal to that range or less. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. P-
scores are reported in parentheses.  
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Table IV Contd.: 
 
 
PSA PSA Accuracy Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Big Donor -0.715*** -0.883*** -0.867*** -0.929*** 0.058*** 0.066*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Donor 0.066*** 0.022 0.083*** 0.028 -0.009*** -0.008*** (0.003) (0.316) (0.000) (0.199) (0.001) (0.001) 
Days to Earnings 0.0004** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.004*** -0.0005*** -0.0007*** (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government Supplier 
0.294*** -0.053** 0.312*** 0.065*** -0.045*** -0.006** 
(0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.029) 
Past PSA 0.290*** 0.081***   (0.000) (0.000)     
Past Accuracy 0.056*** 0.024***  
  
(0.000) (0.001)  
 
Past Above Median 
Average 
 0.152*** 0.073*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Season 0.184*** 0.129*** 0.078*** 0.060*** 0.002 -0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.312) (0.937) 
Pre-Reg FD 
0.148*** 0.062 1.143*** 1.361*** -0.026*** -0.068*** 
(0.000) (0.133) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Long Term Forecast 0.590*** 0.582*** -0.559*** -0.630*** 0.245*** 0.254*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NASDAQ Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
Observations 778,977 778,977 710,785 710,785 825,203 825,203 
Overall R-squared (%) 3.14 2.28 0.92 0.76 3.36 2.75 
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Table V: Price Scaled Accuracy with Firm, Brokerage, Year, and Quarter FEs 
Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) is absolute value of ln((Estimate-Actual)/Share Price), meaning that negative coefficients indicate 
greater accuracy. Accuracy is the relative accuracy of the analyst as defined by the absolute value of ((Estimate-Actual)/Actual, 
and again this means that negative coefficients indicate greater accuracy. Above Median Accuracy is a binary variable equal to 
one if the analyst’s forecast was above the median level of accuracy for the given year. Thus positive coefficients indicate greater 
accuracy here. Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates money to a federal candidate for an election during the 
sample period 1992-2012. Big Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates enough money in a given year to one or 
more candidates to fall into the top 5% of all donors nationally. (Number Range) Days to Earnings is the difference in number of 
days between an analyst’s earnings estimate and the actual earnings announcement of the firm. Gov’t Supplier*Big Donor is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the analyst is a big donor and covering a government supplier. Political Season is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the observation takes place between August and November.  Past PSA is a variable that is the average of the 
analysts past PSAs for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time. Past Accuracy is a 
variable that is the average of the analysts past accuracies for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five 
estimates back in time. Past Above Median Average is a variable that is the average of the analysts past above median averages 
for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time Government Supplier is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm being covered by the analyst receives more than 10% of sales from the government, or is in a heavily 
regulated industry. Political Season is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs during the period of July through 
November. Pre-Reg FD is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs prior to the year 2002. Long Term Forecast is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the estimate is for future quarters’ earnings rather than the current quarter. Market Value is the 
natural log of covered firm market capitalization. Debt-to-Assets is the natural log of the covered firm’s debt to assets ratio. 
Market-to-Book is the natural log of the covered firm’s market to book value where book value is the tangible book equity of the 
firm (tangible assets – liabilities). Cash-to-Debt is the ratio of cash holdings of the covered firm to its liabilities. Democratic 
Congress is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when Democrats are in control of Congress. 
Democratic President is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when a Democrat is President. Days to 
Donation is a binary variable equal to 1 if the difference between a Big Donor analyst’s most recent donation and most recent 
earnings announcement date is equal to that range or less. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. P-
scores are reported in parentheses.   
  PSA PSA Accuracy Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0 - 30 Days to 
Donation 
-2.307*** -2.454*** -2.372*** -2.476*** 0.171*** 0.181*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
30-90 Days to 
Donation 
-0.935*** -1.128*** -1.103*** -1.165*** 0.084*** 0.081*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
90-180 Days to 
Donation 
0.175 0.039 -0.038 -0.076 -0.006 0.010 
(0.149) (0.000) (0.753) (0.519) (0.658) (0.452) 
Other Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NASDAQ Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Covered Firm FE 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
Observations 778,977 778,977 710,785 710,785 825,203 825,203 
R-squared (%) 3.17 2.31 0.95 0.79 3.37 2.77 
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Table VI: The Impact of Political Donations on Accuracy with Analyst FEs  
Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) is absolute value of ln((Estimate-Actual)/Share Price), meaning that negative coefficients indicate 
greater accuracy. Accuracy is the relative accuracy of the analyst as defined by the absolute value of ((Estimate-Actual)/Actual, 
and again this means that negative coefficients indicate greater accuracy. Above Median Accuracy is a binary variable equal to 
one if the analyst’s forecast was above the median level of accuracy for the given year. Thus positive coefficients indicate greater 
accuracy here. Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates money to a federal candidate for an election during the 
sample period 1992-2012. Big Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates enough money in a given year to one or 
more candidates to fall into the top 5% of all donors nationally. (Number Range) Days to Donation is a binary variable equal to 1 
if the difference between a Big Donor analyst’s most recent donation and most recent earnings announcement date is equal to that 
range or less. Days to Earnings is the difference in number of days between an analyst’s earnings estimate and the actual earnings 
announcement of the firm. Past PSA is a variable that is the average of the analysts past PSAs for up to ten of the most recent 
estimates that were at least five estimates back in time. Past Accuracy is a variable that is the average of the analysts past 
accuracies for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time. Past Above Median Average is 
a variable that is the average of the analysts past above median averages for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at 
least five estimates back in time Government Supplier is a binary variable equal to one if the firm being covered by the analyst 
receives more than 10% of sales from the government, or is in a heavily regulated industry. Political Season is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the estimate occurs during the period of July through November. Pre-Reg FD is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the estimate occurs prior to the year 2002. Long Term Forecast is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate is for future 
quarters’ earnings rather than the current quarter. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. P-scores are 
reported in parentheses.  
  PSA PSA Accuracy Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Big Donor -1.037*** -0.332*** -1.140*** -0.407*** 0.096*** 0.023 (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.166) 
Donor 0.018 0.017 0.031 0.030 -0.004 -0.004 (0.549) (0.579) (0.297) (0.314) (0.231) (0.241) 
Days to Earnings 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0 - 30 Days to Big 
Donor Donation 
 -2.265***  -2.268***  0.191*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
30-90 Days to Big 
Donor Donation 
 -0.871***  -0.945***  0.096*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
90-180 Days to Big 
Donor Donation 
 0.174  0.129  0.006 
 (0.338)  (0.473)  (0.760) 
Government Supplier -0.020 -0.019 0.071*** 0.071*** -0.007*** -0.007*** (0.216) (0.222) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past PSA 0.083*** 0.084***     (0.000) (0.000)     
Past Accuracy  0.018** 0.019**   
  (0.015) (0.014)   
Past Above Median 
Average 
   0.037*** 0.037*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Season 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.003 0.003 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.146) (0.149) 
Pre-Reg FD -0.161*** -0.162*** 0.330*** 0.329*** -0.016*** -0.016*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Long Term Forecast 0.565*** 0.564** -0.605*** -0.605*** 0.255*** 0.255*** (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NASDAQ Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Analyst FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 778,977 778,977 710,785 710,785 825,203 825,203 
Overall R-squared (%) 1.78 1.81 0.41 0.44 2.89 2.91 
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Table VII: Impact of Donations on Accuracy Controlling for Industry and Geography 
Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) is absolute value of ln((Estimate-Actual)/Share Price), meaning that negative coefficients indicate 
greater accuracy. Accuracy is the relative accuracy of the analyst as defined by the absolute value of ((Estimate-Actual)/Actual, 
and again this means that negative coefficients indicate greater accuracy. Above Median Accuracy is a binary variable equal to 
one if the analyst’s forecast was above the median level of accuracy for the given year. Thus positive coefficients indicate greater 
accuracy here. Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates money to a federal candidate for an election during the 
sample period 1992-2012. Big Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates enough money in a given year to one or 
more candidates to fall into the top 5% of all donors nationally. (Number Range) Days to Earnings is the difference in number of 
days between an analyst’s earnings estimate and the actual earnings announcement of the firm. Gov’t Supplier*Big Donor is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the analyst is a big donor and covering a government supplier. Political Season is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the observation takes place between August and November.  Past PSA is a variable that is the average of the 
analysts past PSAs for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time. Past Accuracy is a 
variable that is the average of the analysts past accuracies for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five 
estimates back in time. Past Above Median Average is a variable that is the average of the analysts past above median averages 
for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time Government Supplier is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm being covered by the analyst receives more than 10% of sales from the government, or is in a heavily 
regulated industry. Political Season is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs during the period of July through 
November. Pre-Reg FD is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs prior to the year 2002. Long Term Forecast is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the estimate is for future quarters’ earnings rather than the current quarter. Market Value is the 
natural log of covered firm market capitalization. Debt-to-Assets is the natural log of the covered firm’s debt to assets ratio. 
Market-to-Book is the natural log of the covered firm’s market to book value where book value is the tangible book equity of the 
firm (tangible assets – liabilities). Cash-to-Debt is the ratio of cash holdings of the covered firm to its liabilities. Democratic 
Congress is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when Democrats are in control of Congress. 
Democratic President is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when a Democrat is President. Days to 
Donation is a binary variable equal to 1 if the difference between a Big Donor analyst’s most recent donation and most recent 
earnings announcement date is equal to that range or less. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. P-
scores are reported in parentheses.  
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Table VII Contd.: 
  PSA PSA Accuracy Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Big Donor 0.100 0.053 -0.076 -0.095 -0.012 -0.003 (0.461) (0.695) (0.571) (0.477) (0.440) (0.861) 
Donor 0.103*** 0.067** 0.110*** 0.085*** -0.013*** -0.013*** (0.001) (0.032) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) 
Days to Earnings 0.0004** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0-30 Days to Big Donor 
Donation 
-2.409*** -2.379*** -2.284*** -2.264*** 0.182*** 0.180*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
30-90 Days to Big Donor 
Donation 
-1.043*** -1.020*** -1.027*** -1.021*** 0.096*** 0.092*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
90-180 Days to Big Donor 
Donation 
-0.078 0.061 0.047 0.058 0.006 0.004 
(0.667) (0.733) (0.793) (0.744) (0.781) (0.866) 
Government Supplier 0.296*** 0.423*** 0.303*** 0.186* -0.045*** 0.0009 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.435) 
Past PSA 0.302*** 0.242***    (0.000) (0.000)     
Past Accuracy 0.066*** 0.058***  
  (0.000) (0.000)   
Past Above Median Average   0.152*** 0.118*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Season 0.133*** 0.121*** 0.003 0.005 -0.005*** 0.005*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.859) (0.765) (0.005) (0.007) 
Pre-Reg FD -0.301*** -0.243*** 0.349*** 0.349*** -0.023*** -0.021*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Long Term Forecast 0.601*** 0.964*** -0.557*** -0.579*** 0.244*** 0.246*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Geographic Link -0.070* -0.042 -0.055 -0.055 0.066 0.009* (0.091) (0.299) (0.179) (0.178) (0.166) (0.057) 
Committee Link -0.319*** -0.300*** -0.397*** -0.365*** 0.004*** 0.001 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250) 
NASDAQ Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 778,977 778,977 710,785 710,785 825,203 825,203 
Adj./Overall R-squared (%) 2.93 2.74 0.79 0.71 3.35 3.06 
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Table VIII: Pre-Big Donor Period Analyst Accuracy 
 Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) is absolute value of ln((Estimate-Actual)/Share Price), meaning that negative coefficients indicate 
greater accuracy. Accuracy is the relative accuracy of the analyst as defined by the absolute value of ((Estimate-Actual)/Actual, 
and again this means that negative coefficients indicate greater accuracy. Above Median Accuracy is a binary variable equal to 
one if the analyst’s forecast was above the median level of accuracy for the given year. Thus positive coefficients indicate greater 
accuracy here. Pre-Donation*Big Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the estimates occurs in the up to three estimates on a 
given company before the point in time when the analyst becomes a Big Donor. Past PSA is a variable that is the average of the 
analysts past PSAs for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time. Past Accuracy is a 
variable that is the average of the analysts past accuracies for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five 
estimates back in time. Past Above Median Average is a variable that is the average of the analysts past above median averages 
for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time Government Supplier is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm being covered by the analyst receives more than 10% of sales from the government, or is in a heavily 
regulated industry. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. P-scores are reported in parentheses.  
Variables  PSA Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Pre-Donation*Big Donor 0.919*** 0.861*** -0.075*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past PSA 0.293***   (0.000)   
Past Accuracy 0.163  
 (0.123)  
Past Above Median Accuracy  0.159*** 
  (0.000) 
Government Supplier 0.253** 0.300** -0.063*** (0.036) (0.010) (0.000) 
Observation Pairs 8,082 7,350 8,587 
R-squared (%) 2.05 0.66 1.01 
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Table IX: Post-Big Donor Period Analyst Accuracy 
Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) is absolute value of ln((Estimate-Actual)/Share Price), meaning that negative coefficients indicate 
greater accuracy. Accuracy is the relative accuracy of the analyst as defined by the absolute value of ((Estimate-Actual)/Actual, 
and again this means that negative coefficients indicate greater accuracy. Above Median Accuracy is a binary variable equal to 
one if the analyst’s forecast was above the median level of accuracy for the given year. Thus positive coefficients indicate greater 
accuracy here. Post Donation*Big Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the estimates occur in the up to three estimates on a 
given company after the point in time when the analyst ceases to be a Big Donor. Past PSA is a variable that is the average of the 
analysts past PSAs for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time. Past Accuracy is a 
variable that is the average of the analysts past accuracies for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five 
estimates back in time. Past Above Median Average is a variable that is the average of the analysts past above median averages 
for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time Government Supplier is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm being covered by the analyst receives more than 10% of sales from the government, or is in a heavily 
regulated industry. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. P-scores are reported in parentheses.  
Variables  PSA Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Post Donation*Big Donor 0.958*** 1.123*** -0.092*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past PSA 0.317***   (0.000)   
Past Accuracy 0.160  
 (0.114)  
Past Above Median Accuracy  0.183*** 
  (0.000) 
Government Supplier 0.302** 0.345*** -0.064*** (0.011) (0.003) (0.000) 
Observation Pairs 8,199 7,445 8,663 
R-squared (%) 3.08 1.70 1.66 
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Table X: Difference-in-Differences of Pre and Post Big Donor Accuracy 
 Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) is absolute value of ln((Estimate-Actual)/Share Price), meaning that negative coefficients indicate 
greater accuracy. Accuracy is the relative accuracy of the analyst as defined by the absolute value of ((Estimate-Actual)/Actual, 
and again this means that negative coefficients indicate greater accuracy. Above Median Accuracy is a binary variable equal to 
one if the analyst’s forecast was above the median level of accuracy for the given year. Thus positive coefficients indicate greater 
accuracy here. Pre-Donation*Big Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the estimates occurs in the up to three estimates on a 
given company before the point in time when the analyst becomes a Big Donor. Past PSA is a variable that is the average of the 
analysts past PSAs for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time. Past Accuracy is a 
variable that is the average of the analysts past accuracies for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five 
estimates back in time. Past Above Median Average is a variable that is the average of the analysts past above median averages 
for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time Government Supplier is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm being covered by the analyst receives more than 10% of sales from the government, or is in a heavily 
regulated industry. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. P-scores are reported in parentheses.  
Variables  PSA Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
PSA Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pre-Donation*Big Donor 0.139* 0.242*** -0.058***    (0.055) (0.001) (0.000)    
Post-Donation*Big Donor   0.425*** 0.421*** -0.042*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Big Donor -0.804*** -1.024*** 0.095*** -0.996*** -1.152*** 0.087*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government Supplier 0.292*** 0.305*** -0.043*** 0.293*** 0.305*** -0.043*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Accuracy Measure 0.290*** 0.056*** 0.151*** 0.185*** 0.056*** 0.151*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year and Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation Pairs 778,977 710,785 825,203 778,977 710,785 825,203 
R-squared (%) 3.14 0.92 3.31 3.15 0.92 3.31 
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Table XI: Correlation Coefficients  
Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) is absolute value of ln((Estimate-Actual)/Share Price), meaning that negative coefficients indicate 
greater accuracy. Accuracy is the relative accuracy of the analyst as defined by the absolute value of ((Estimate-Actual)/Actual, 
and again this means that negative coefficients indicate greater accuracy. Above Median Accuracy is a binary variable equal to 
one if the analyst’s forecast was above the median level of accuracy for the given year. Thus positive coefficients indicate greater 
accuracy here. Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates money to a federal candidate for an election during the 
sample period 1992-2012. Big Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates enough money in a given year to one or 
more candidates to fall into the top 5% of all donors nationally. (Number Range) Days to Earnings is the difference in number of 
days between an analyst’s earnings estimate and the actual earnings announcement of the firm. Gov’t Supplier*Big Donor is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the analyst is a big donor and covering a government supplier. Political Season is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the observation takes place between August and November.  Past PSA is a variable that is the average of the 
analysts past PSAs for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time. Past Accuracy is a 
variable that is the average of the analysts past accuracies for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five 
estimates back in time. Past Above Median Average is a variable that is the average of the analysts past above median averages 
for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time Government Supplier is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm being covered by the analyst receives more than 10% of sales from the government, or is in a heavily 
regulated industry. Political Season is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs during the period of July through 
November. Pre-Reg FD is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs prior to the year 2002. Long Term Forecast is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the estimate is for future quarters’ earnings rather than the current quarter. Market Value is the 
natural log of covered firm market capitalization. Debt-to-Assets is the natural log of the covered firm’s debt to assets ratio. 
Market-to-Book is the natural log of the covered firm’s market to book value where book value is the tangible book equity of the 
firm (tangible assets – liabilities). Cash-to-Debt is the ratio of cash holdings of the covered firm to its liabilities. Democratic 
Congress is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when Democrats are in control of Congress. 
Democratic President is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when a Democrat is President. Days to 
Donation is a binary variable equal to 1 if the difference between a Big Donor analyst’s most recent donation and most recent 
earnings announcement date is equal to that range or less. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. P-
scores are reported in parentheses.  
 
  PSA Accur. 
Above 
Median 
Accur. 
Donor Days to Earnings 
Gov't 
Supplier D2A M2B MV 
Cash-to-
Debt 
Big Donor -0.014* -0.016* 0.008* -0.326* -0.007* 0.005* 0.008* -0.007 0.002* -0.006* 
PSA 1.000 0.911* -0.273* 0.002 0.004* 0.031* 0.006* -0.098* -0.204* 0.021* 
Accuracy 
 
1.000 -0.519* -0.001 0.005* 0.025* 0.003 -0.025* -0.060 0.002 
Above Median 
Accuracy   1.000 -0.004* -0.025* -0.024* 0.011* 0.008* 0.041* 0.003 
Donor 
   
1.000 -0.001 0.005* 0.003 0.000 0.005* -0.004* 
Days to 
Earnings     1.000 -0.067* -0.027* 0.064* 0.018* 0.031* 
Gov't Supplier 
     
1.000 0.131* -0.115* 0.060* -0.023* 
Debt-to-Assets 
      
1.000 -0.226* 0.088* -0.527* 
Market-to-
Book        1.000 0.252* 0.209* 
Market Value 
        
1.000 -0.063* 
Cash-to-Debt 
         
1.000 
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Table XII: Alternative Measures of Big Donor Status 
Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) is absolute value of ln((Estimate-Actual)/Share Price), meaning that negative coefficients indicate 
greater accuracy. Accuracy is the relative accuracy of the analyst as defined by the absolute value of ((Estimate-Actual)/Actual, 
and again this means that negative coefficients indicate greater accuracy. Above Median Accuracy is a binary variable equal to 
one if the analyst’s forecast was above the median level of accuracy for the given year. Thus positive coefficients indicate greater 
accuracy here. Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates money to a federal candidate for an election during the 
sample period 1992-2012. Big Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates enough money in a given year to one or 
more candidates to fall into the top 5% of all donors nationally. (Number Range) Days to Earnings is the difference in number of 
days between an analyst’s earnings estimate and the actual earnings announcement of the firm. Gov’t Supplier*Big Donor is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the analyst is a big donor and covering a government supplier. Political Season is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the observation takes place between August and November.  Past PSA is a variable that is the average of the 
analysts past PSAs for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time. Past Accuracy is a 
variable that is the average of the analysts past accuracies for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five 
estimates back in time. Past Above Median Average is a variable that is the average of the analysts past above median averages 
for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time Government Supplier is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm being covered by the analyst receives more than 10% of sales from the government, or is in a heavily 
regulated industry. Political Season is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs during the period of July through 
November. Pre-Reg FD is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs prior to the year 2002. Long Term Forecast is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the estimate is for future quarters’ earnings rather than the current quarter. Market Value is the 
natural log of covered firm market capitalization. Debt-to-Assets is the natural log of the covered firm’s debt to assets ratio. 
Market-to-Book is the natural log of the covered firm’s market to book value where book value is the tangible book equity of the 
firm (tangible assets – liabilities). Cash-to-Debt is the ratio of cash holdings of the covered firm to its liabilities. Democratic 
Congress is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when Democrats are in control of Congress. 
Democratic President is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when a Democrat is President. Days to 
Donation is a binary variable equal to 1 if the difference between a Big Donor analyst’s most recent donation and most recent 
earnings announcement date is equal to that range or less. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. P-
scores are reported in parentheses.  
  PSA PSA Accuracy Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Donor Quartile 1 -0.516***  -0.519***  0.030***  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Donor Quartile 2 -0.043  -0.009  -0.009*  (0.377) 
 
(0.863) 
 
(0.100) 
 
Donor Quartile 3 0.012  0.055  -0.005  (0.787) 
 
(0.228) 
 
(0.324) 
 
Donation Amount (In 
Thousands of USD)  
-0.025***  -0.026***  0.001*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NASDAQ Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 778,977 778,977 710,785 710,785 825,203 825,203 
R-squared (%) 2.27 2.27 0.75 0.75 2.75 2.75 
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Table XIII: The Impact of Political Donations on Price Scaled Accuracy with Firm FEs  
Price Scaled Accuracy (PSA) is absolute value of ln((Estimate-Actual)/Share Price), meaning that negative coefficients indicate 
greater accuracy. Accuracy is the relative accuracy of the analyst as defined by the absolute value of ((Estimate-Actual)/Actual, 
and again this means that negative coefficients indicate greater accuracy. Above Median Accuracy is a binary variable equal to 
one if the analyst’s forecast was above the median level of accuracy for the given year. Thus positive coefficients indicate greater 
accuracy here. Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates money to a federal candidate for an election during the 
sample period 1992-2012. Big Donor is a binary variable equal to 1 if the analyst donates enough money in a given year to one or 
more candidates to fall into the top 5% of all donors nationally. (Number Range) Days to Earnings is the difference in number of 
days between an analyst’s earnings estimate and the actual earnings announcement of the firm. Gov’t Supplier*Big Donor is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the analyst is a big donor and covering a government supplier. Political Season is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the observation takes place between August and November.  Past PSA is a variable that is the average of the 
analysts past PSAs for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time. Past Accuracy is a 
variable that is the average of the analysts past accuracies for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five 
estimates back in time. Past Above Median Average is a variable that is the average of the analysts past above median averages 
for up to ten of the most recent estimates that were at least five estimates back in time Government Supplier is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm being covered by the analyst receives more than 10% of sales from the government, or is in a heavily 
regulated industry. Political Season is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs during the period of July through 
November. Pre-Reg FD is a dummy variable equal to one if the estimate occurs prior to the year 2002. Long Term Forecast is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the estimate is for future quarters’ earnings rather than the current quarter. Market Value is the 
natural log of covered firm market capitalization. Debt-to-Assets is the natural log of the covered firm’s debt to assets ratio. 
Market-to-Book is the natural log of the covered firm’s market to book value where book value is the tangible book equity of the 
firm (tangible assets – liabilities). Cash-to-Debt is the ratio of cash holdings of the covered firm to its liabilities. Democratic 
Congress is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when Democrats are in control of Congress. 
Democratic President is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation takes place when a Democrat is President. Days to 
Donation is a binary variable equal to 1 if the difference between a Big Donor analyst’s most recent donation and most recent 
earnings announcement date is equal to that range or less. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. P-
scores are reported in parentheses.  
  PSA PSA Accuracy Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
100-95th Percentile 
Donations 
-0.821*** -1.150*** -0.951*** -1.189*** 0.043*** 0.067*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
95-90th Percentile 
Donations 
-0.509*** -0.670*** -0.639*** -0.734*** 0.046*** 0.038*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
90-85th Percentile 
Donations 
0.127 -0.094 0.128 -0.006 0.029** 0.021 
(0.287) (0.406) (0.285) (0.957) (0.030) (0.101) 
85-80th Percentile 
Donations 
0.245** -0.012 0.108 -0.097 -0.015 -0.007 
(0.017) (0.902) (0.293) (0.343) (0.206) (0.567) 
80-75th Percentile 
Donations 
0.110 0.037 0.150 0.124 -0.029** -0.021* 
(0.315) (0.725) (0.174) (0.254) (0.025) (0.088) 
Lower Percentiles Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Past accuracy (PSA, 
Accuracy, Above 
Median Accuracy)  
0.299*** 0.082*** 0.058*** 0.025*** 0.155*** 0.082*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Days to Earnings -0.0002 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.004*** -0.0006*** -0.0008*** (0.166) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NASDAQ Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
Observations 778,977 778,977 710,785 710,785 825,203 825,203 
Overall R-squared (%) 2.83 2.20 0.61 0.53 0.85 0.42 
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Table XIV: Accuracy Based on Party-Based Donation Amounts 
Log of Donation Amount is the natural log of the amount donated by a given analyst in a given quarter. Donation Amount 
Squared is the square of the amount donated by a given analyst in a given quarter. Donation Percentile is the percentile in the 
donor distribution in which the analyst falls in a given quarter. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
respectively. P-scores are reported in parentheses. Standard Errors are clustered by analyst. 
  PSA PSA Accuracy Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
Above 
Median 
Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Democratic Donation Amount -0.052***  -0.044***  0.002** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)  (0.035)  
Republican Donation Amount -0.033*** 
 
-0.037***  0.003** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NASDAQ Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 40,375 40,375 36,879 36,879 42,928 42,928 
R-squared (%) 2.10 2.05 0.73 0.68 2.40 2.38 
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